We examine the effect of corruption on health and education outcomes in the Philippines. We find that corruption reduces the immunization rates, delays the vaccination of newborns, discourages the use of public health clinics, reduces satisfaction of households with public health services, and increases waiting time at health clinics. Corruption also has a negative effect on education outcomes: it reduces test scores, lowers national ranking of schools, raises variation of test scores across schools and reduces satisfaction ratings. We also find that corruption affects public services in rural areas in different ways than urban areas, and that corruption harms the poor more than the wealthy. JEL Classifications: H4, I1, I2.
I. Introduction
There are several mechanisms by which corruption might undermine service delivery.
Corruption can increase the cost to consumers if a bribe is demanded in addition to the official payment, which reduces demand for services and therefore may worsen health and education outcomes. If however corruption takes the form of the official pocketing the payment intended for the government, this reduces government resources allocated to service delivery, which would also worsen outcomes. As noted by Pritchett (1996) the relationship between public spending and outcomes is usually ambiguous in many countries, and this ambiguity may be a reflection of differences in the efficacy of spending due to corruption. A number of past studies have looked at the effect of corruption on public sector performance in health, education, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) ). In this paper we supplement these results and examine the effects of corruption at the local level in the Philippines on health and education services.
This approach has the advantage that it keeps fixed a large number of variables that vary across countries and cause omitted variable problems and other econometric problems in cross sectional regressions.
Five years after the democratic revolution in the Philippines, the Local Governments Act of 1991 devolved both political authority and administrative control of many health services and other subjects to the provincial and municipal level. Much of the corruption in the Philippines does appear to be at the local level: of the 336 corruption cases current in mid-2000, 49% were against municipal mayors-the level of government, which is our focus in this study (Batalla 2000) . Many observers have stated that corruption is the root cause of continued poverty in the Philippines (World Bank (2000) ). All this makes our study of local level corruption and service delivery in the Philippines highly relevant in a country specific context.
In addition studies such as this one might have global relevance in terms of the increasingly important question of the effect of corruption on service delivery. Our results resonate with cross-country results (e.g., Gupta et al. (2002)), which find a negative correlation between corruption and health outcomes. However, we acknowledge the difficulty of generalizing from cross-country results and one possibly unrepresentative country, and would prefer to replicate this study in other countries with a large number of local governments before making global prescriptions. This paper is structured as follows. We begin by describing the data. In particular we examine in detail the quality of the data on corruption and are reassured by a number of correlations across samples. The corruption perceptions of households, municipal administrators and municipal health officers are all correlated with each other and the corruption perceptions of households are highly correlated with the corruption perceptions of other households in their municipality.
Emboldened by these findings, we begin to examine the consequences of corruption.
Here we use several different outcome measures from different sources. We use households' reports of waiting time, their satisfaction with government health services, access to public health clinics, immunization rate of children, and delay between the birth of a child and his/her immunization. In each case we find the expected negative and significant effect of corruption on performance. Our results for education are similar. We find a significant negative effect on test scores, national ranking of schools, variation of test scores within schools, and household assessments of satisfaction with public education. Our empirical analysis also highlights the disproportionate burden of corruption on the poor. The perverse effect of corruption on health and education outcomes is also more serious in rural areas as compared to urban areas.
We provide information about the experience of Philippines with decentralization reforms in the next section. The data and the econometric models are described in sections 3 and 4, respectively. We analyze the consequences of corruption in section 5. The robustness of our results is discussed in Section 6. A conclusion follows.
II. Country Background
The Philippines is a country of 70 million people who live upon thousands of islands that municipalities and over 40,000 barangays or neighborhoods 2 . In addition, it mandated regular elections for local executives and legislative bodies. The Code devolved "basic services" to local governments-these include most health services along with such infrastructure provision as school, clinic, and local road building. Local government units (LGUs) have authority to create their own revenue sources (within firm limits), as well as to enter international aid agreements. 1 The country background is adapted from Azfar, O. et al. (2004) . It corresponds to the situation in 2000, when the data was collected.
Philippines, the local share of education finance has grown. There is a major tax earmark for education, the Special Education Fund (SEF), whose uses are determined by local school boards.
III. Data Description
Our data is based on eight surveys undertaken in We begin by discussing our central variable of interest -corruption. We define corruption as the abuse of office for personal gain (Klitgaard et al. (2000) ). Corruption manifests itself in several ways: through shirking, the sale of jobs, bribery, and the theft of funds and supplies. We asked questions about all these improprieties in the surveys of government officials. Results are presented in Table 1 . There are reports of all kinds of corruption in each kind of government office -with the sole exception of the theft of supplies in the municipal education (DECS) office.
Most kinds of corruption are more prevalent in the municipal administrators office than in other offices, perhaps due to the administrator's office exerting more authority and thus having more opportunity to extract rents (see Azfar and Gurgur 2000 for more on this subject). Nineteen percent of municipal administrators stated that there were cases of bribery in their office in the last year and a full 32% that there were instances of the theft of funds. By contrast only 2.5% of municipal health officers and 1.3 % of municipal DECS officers reported incidents of bribery in their office with 16.5% and 1.3%, respectively, reporting the theft of funds.
We next created an index of corruption from its various components. This index is the normalized sum of the first seven variables in Table 1 . This index is correlated at 0.5 or above with most of its components for both the municipal administrator and the municipal DECS officers. These high correlations, which reflect some positive link among the components of the index, are the first sign that our index is measuring some coherent underlying variable.
We had also asked a general question on "how common is corruption in the municipal government" with four possible answers: non-existent; rare; common; very common. If our index were a good measure of corruption we would expect it to be correlated with the answer to this question. In fact the indices are highly correlated with the answers to this general question with a significance level of 5% or less for all municipal officials and officials at public health centers.
Moreover the corruption perceptions of households and public officials are positively correlated: We constructed a "public officials corruption index" combining the answers of public officials working at public schools, health clinics and municipalities. The resulting index is correlated at 0.28 (p-value=0.01) with households' corruption perceptions.
We also constructed measures of other aspects of public sector management and civic community, which are categorized in three groups: Most of these variables, which are described in Table 2 , are composite indices between 0 and 1 and are constructed using several survey questions 4 .
Our measures of performance in health and education services include both hard data obtained from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education in Philippines and users'
perceptions and responses that we derive from the Household Survey. These variables are explained in Table 3 .
IV. Econometric Model
We estimate the effect of corruption (as well as other variables) on performance of health and education services using various methods, including random effect, tobit, ordinary-least squares and robust regressions, at the household, school, and municipality level as appropriate.
The main justification for the random effects model is the individual units of analyses (households) in our sample nested within higher-level units of analysis, which we identify as provinces. A province in Philippines is the largest unit in the political structure, comprising of a number of municipalities and (in some cases) cities with more or less homogenous characteristics, such as ethnic origin of inhabitants, dialect spoken, agricultural produce, etc.
Therefore, it is possible that unobservable effects in each cross-section (province) may cause biased estimates.
To address these concerns, we consider fixed-effects and random-effects models for econometric analysis. As long as it is theoretically and statistically justified, a random effects model is preferred to a fixed (within) effect model, since the latter ignores the information offered by the comparison between provinces and consequently it is less efficient. However, an important assumption behind random effects estimators is that random components of provincespecific effects are not correlated with the regressors. We test the appropriateness of this assumption using Hausman test, which compares fixed effects estimators and random effects estimators. Since fixed effects estimators are always consistent regardless of the orthogonality condition, a significant difference between the estimates indicates correlation between the regressors and the province-specific effects. If this is the case, we only report fixed effects regression results. Otherwise, we use maximum-likelihood estimation that fully maximizes the likelihood of the random-effects model. When our dependent variable is binary (e.g. use of public health facilities), we use conditional logit and random-effects probit for fixed-effects and random effects, respectively. In the latter, the likelihood is expressed as an integral computed using Gauss-Hermite quadrature approximation and its numerical fitness is checked by reestimating the model with different quadrature points and comparing the change in estimates. If the coefficients change by more than 1% the results are interpreted as unstable and not reported.
We should note that even when statistically justified, it is still theoretically debatable to justify orthogonality between unobserved province-specific effects and explanatory variables, since it is quite possible to imagine the confounding influence of these unobserved effects on at least some regressors in the model (for example, a drug problem in one province may affect the accountability or corruption variables). Hence, we always report estimates of fixed-effects model along with random-effects results.
Almost in all cases we also try estimation via ordered probit method after transforming continuous dependent variables, such as NEAT scores, school rankings, and standard deviation of NEAT scores, into discrete ones. Although this approach lowers the information content of dependent variables, the coefficient estimates are less likely to be affected by potential measurement errors in dependent variables.
When our dependent variable is a performance measure based on government statistics, the corresponding econometric model is either at school-level (e.g. test results) or at municipallevel (e.g. immunization rate). When survey questions are used as dependent variables, we estimate the model at the household level rather then aggregating the data in order to capture household-specific effects, such as child characteristics, household income or education. We also disaggregate the corruption variable based on location (urban vs. rural) and prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle-income, and poor) to understand whether corruption affects one area more or less than others depending on differences in regional characteristics.
V. Results

V.1 Health Outcomes
Our first performance measure is immunization coverage in the Philippines. The regression model for percent of children immunized is at the municipal level since the Ministry of Health provides data only on municipal averages. This limits our sample to 33 municipalities (we lose several municipalities because of missing data). The results are presented in Table 5 .
Local governments with high corruption level are less successful in providing immunization to their communities. One standard deviation increase in corruption reduces immunization rate by 11-19 % 5 . The robustness of results to outliers is confirmed by the use of robust regression and ordered probit models. Urbanization rates, unequal distribution of wealth, and distance to health centers (as reported by public health facilities) also negatively influence immunization coverage.
Surprisingly, empirical results also indicate a negative partial correlation between immunization and local prosperity, for which we have no easy explanation. We do not observe any difference between rural vs. urban or rich vs. poor municipalities in terms of the effect of corruption. The coefficients are usually significant and similar in magnitude.
Our next six dependent variables are derived from the Household survey and the regressions are run at the household level. Although it is possible to run the same regressions at more aggregate level (e.g. barangay or municipality), we prefer a household level analysis because it allows us to use of household-level variables as regressors, such as child or household characteristics. Additionally, to highlight the importance of community-specific variables, some household level variables are aggregated at the municipal level. We, first, run regressions using individual-specific variables alone (such as education, wealth, urbanization, social participation, and reading newspapers) and then we add municipal averages of these variables to capture community-specific effects.
Regression results on vaccination of children (as reported by households) are presented in Table 6 . The sample is restricted to households with children of at least one year old. This ensures that the households covered in our sample are the ones who should complete the vaccinations of their children. The simple correlation between this variable and the previous dependent variable is reasonably high (r = 0.46). The results show that the coefficient of corruption variable is significant at 5% and its magnitude is quite substantial. The odds of completing vaccination can decrease 1.8 to 4.2 times as a result of a one standard deviation increase in corruption 6 . The size of public health facilities in the area has a negative impact on immunization, suggesting that this variable is a proxy for excessive demand rather than adequate supply (If governments respond to excess demand by increasing capacity, but less than is needed, then larger facilities will be associated with more excess demand and hence lower immunization rates. Another explanation is diseconomies of scale in the provision of vaccines). Unlike the previous regression, this time wealth, rather than education of households, has a significant and positive impact on immunization. Both the existence of private health providers and distance to alternative public health facilities appear significant, albeit with wrong signs. It is possible that both variables, similar to size of health facilities, are correlated with demand for health services.
Among public sector management variables, we find that the frequency of audit by central government and autonomy of local governments increases the immunization coverage.
Next, we look at the causes of delay in vaccination of children. Our dependent variable is the log of time (in months) between birth of a child and his/her immunization provided that the child is at least one year old and that all immunizations have been completed. The variable is the average of eight required immunizations (BCG, Polio 1-2-3, DPT 1-2-3, and Measles). The first two columns in Table 7 on the other hand, has the opposite effect: infants are more likely to be vaccinated at later ages.
We also find that corruption is more damaging in rural municipalities as compared to urban ones, but the difference is not statistically significant.
The regression results on choosing public health facilities for immunization are shown in In Table 9 we study the waiting time (as reported by households) in public health clinics.
In addition to fixed-effects method, we also address sample selection issue using Heckman's selection model since households may select themselves out of using public health clinics.
Although the correlation between selection and outcome processes is not significant, the magnitude of the correlation (rho=0.11) is reasonably large and warrants reporting the results in column (3). Due to concerns for perception bias on the behalf of households (that is, households facing frequent delays would be suspicious of corruption in health facilities), we only use the corruption perceptions of public officials our corruption measure. Corruption variable is significant at 5 % when community-specific effects are not considered (first column), but becomes only marginally significant when these effects are added to the model (column 2 and 3).
When we disaggregate the corruption variable based on location (urban vs. rural) and prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle-income, and poor), we find that the influence of corruption on waiting time is negligible in rich and/or urban communities. However, in rural regions one standard deviation in corruption can increase waiting time as much as 28% and in poor municipalities 15% 12 .
In Table 10 we use the incidence of being denied a vaccine from public health facilities (as reported by households). In addition to fixed-and random-effects model, we also use Heckman's selection method, because the outcome variable is observable only if a household chooses to use public health facilities. We again replace the composite corruption index with the corruption perceptions of public officials, because the denial of a vaccine could affect a household's corruption perceptions. All estimation methods indicate that the corruption variable is significant at 5% or less. A one standard deviation worsening in corruption may raise the likelihood of being denied vaccines by 1.23-1.47 times 13 . In urban areas this increase is more significant and can be as much as 2.13 fold 14 . Interestingly, the probability of being denied a vaccine is positively related to the size of health facilities. As we discussed previously, the size of health facilities is likely to be proportional to the demand for health services. The results also
show that patients are less likely to be denied a vaccine from public health clinics, if private centers exist in the area or alternative private clinics are close enough.
Our last health-related performance variable is households' satisfaction with public health clinics. Once again, in addition to fixed-and random-effects models, we use Heckman's selection model to address sample selection problems (use of public health facilities is a prerequisite for reporting satisfaction rating). Our corruption index excludes households' corruption perception.
The results, reported in poor municipalities 15 . We also find that the influence of corruption is slightly lower in urban and/or rich municipalities, though the difference is not statistically significant.
In summary, our econometric analysis reveals that corruption has a significant and negative effect on all health-related performance variables. In most cases the coefficient is significant at 5 percent or less. The robustness of these results is checked using various estimation techniques and different model specifications, which is discussed in the next section in more detail. The corruption variable remains the single most important factor that influences health outcomes in a consistent basis. We also find that demand for public health care is more "corruption-elastic" in urban areas, i.e. corruption reduces households' use of public health facilities and the likelihood of getting vaccines from public clinics in urban areas, but it has less influence over these two variables in rural areas. However, the effect of corruption on waiting time in public health clinics is less significant in the urban areas. We attribute these results to the presence of alternative health facilities in urban areas -either in the form of private health care providers or other public health facilities. On the other hand, citizens in rural areas with rampant corruption suffer with more waiting at public health clinics, late immunization of infants and report less satisfaction with public health services.
We also run regressions to understand the effect of corruption in rich, middle-income and poor municipalities. Regardless of the relative prosperity of a municipality, corruption hurts satisfaction with public clinics, immunization rate of children, and average age of infants to get vaccines. Poor and middle-income municipalities also report more waiting at public clinics and more frequency of being denied vaccines when corruption is epidemic. Corruption in public clinics is also more likely to deter households living in poor municipalities from using public clinics and forces them to opt for self-medication.
Our results also show that voting is not an effective mechanism to discipline local governments -one possible explanation is that people might be voting on the basis of factors other than improvements in service delivery. Exit mechanisms, in the form of existence of private health facilities and accessibility of alternative health clinics, seem to have a more significant impact, especially on the satisfaction with public health care, vaccinations of infants at earlier ages, and accessibility of public health clinics for immunization. When it comes to public sector management variables (accountability mechanisms, audit by central government, and autonomy of local governments), we observe mixed results. The index that we constructed for accountability of health facilities and municipalities remains insignificant in most regressions and has wrong sign when it becomes significant. Audits by the central government have negative effects on several health outcomes. Higher autonomy in local governments improves immunization rate (as reported by households), raises accessibility of public health facilities for immunization and reduces the time length between birth of an infant and his/her immunization, but it also leads to longer waiting times.
V.2 Education
Next, we look at the education-related performance variables. All econometric models, except households' satisfaction ratings, are at barangay levels.
We start with households' satisfaction with public schools. The results are reported in Table 12 . The estimation methods we use include fixed-and random-effects to capture regionspecific factors, as well as Heckman's selection method to address school selection process that precedes satisfaction ratings. As we did before, we exclude households' opinion on corruption and use only public officials' perceptions to prevent a biased link between the dependent variable and the regressor. We find that the corruption variable appears significant at 5% in randomeffects model, but only marginally significant in fixed-effects and Heckman's selection models.
The results do not show any statistically significant partial correlation between corruption and households' satisfaction with public schools in urban areas or rich municipalities. Existence of private schools in the area and frequency of reading newspapers are two other variables with significantly negative influence over schools' satisfaction ratings. It is possible that both variables enable households to compare the performance of their schools with alternatives and make them more critical in their assessments.
Next, we move to more objective education outcomes in public schools. Dependent variables are at the school level and they include various measures of success in a nation-wide exam (NEAT). The most obvious measure of the quality of service delivery is the mean of the NEAT score and the closely related school ranking. Variation of students' test scores within a school is another outcome variable. It shows whether a school is able to provide equal opportunity to its students to achieve their potential. We measure variation in terms of standard deviation of test results. However, since the standard deviation of a variable is likely to be proportional to its mean, we also use the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the sample average) as another measure of variance.
The results on percentage of student passing NEAT are presented in Table 13 . We find that corruption in the public sector, in particular in rural municipalities, significantly reduces the success rate of students. A one standard deterioration in corruption around its mean causes a 12% decrease in number of students passing NEAT. There is no evidence that the effect of corruption differs between affluent municipalities and poor municipalities. Among other significant variables we find that schools with better financial and personnel capacity are able to raise the percentage of students passing NEAT. Barangays with better-educated households also witness better test scores -this may represent a parent-child human capital transfer. Higher voter turnout pushes test scores up, whereas influence of ethnicity in elections and wealth inequality within municipalities hurt education results. Exit mechanisms (existence of private schools in the area), accountability mechanisms, and audit by central government are mostly ineffective.
As shown in Table 14 average NEAT scores of students are also adversely affected by corruption in public sector. A one standard increase in corruption reduces NEAT scores as much as 11%. Comparing the effect of corruption in rich and poor municipalities, we observe that corruption has slightly more negative effect in rich municipalities. Education of parents and autonomy of public schools in decision-making are found to improve test scores, whereas wealth inequality and voting based on ethnicity reduces school performance.
Another outcome variable that we used in our regressions is the national ranking of schools based on NEAT scores (Table 15 ). The effect of corruption is even more striking: a one standard deviation increase in corruption increases school ranking as much as 93% (higher ranks correspond to worse performance). Corruption is especially damaging in rural areas, where the magnitude of corruption coefficient is 2-3 larger.
In addition to performance variables measuring level of success in NEAT scores, we also look at the variation of scores within schools. As shown in Table 16 , the standard deviation of NEAT scores rises where corruption is more persistent, especially in rural areas. The other two significant variables are school capacity index and ethnic divisions (proxied by ethnicity considerations in voting decisions). Schools that enjoy better financial and personnel resources are produce less equal outcomes. One possible explanation is that better off parents are more motivated to capture resources when capacity is higher. Pervasiveness of ethnic divisions in communities also has a similar effect. Since it is possible that standard deviation of test scores may be inflated by higher test scores, we also look at the coefficient of variation, which divides sample standard deviation by sample average. The results, reported in Table 17 , are similar.
Corruption and voting based on ethnicity have still negative impact on education outcomes.
Capacity also appears to be related to greater inequality in outcomes.
VI. Robustness
VI.1 Selection
We have shown that there is a significant partial correlation between 13 dependant variables that measure various aspects of health and education services and corruption perceptions, after controlling for capacity (based on measures of human and physical capital), adult education levels, urban residence, living standards (as proxied by assets), inequality, existence of private sector competition, voting and media exposure, accountability measures, and local autonomy.
To check the robustness of the regression results we use a robust regression method that involves down weighing observations that resemble outliers. It begins by estimating the regression, calculating Cook's D distance statistics and excluding any observation with D>1.
After that a weight is assigned to each observation inversely proportional to its residual. The appropriateness of this robust regression method may be questionable as the number of observations with small weights increases (we report the portion of the sample with weights less than 0.75). As one can see from the regression tables, robust estimates are very close to the ones we obtain from other estimation methods. Hence, we conclude that our results are not greatly influenced by any outlier in the sample.
Another concern that we address is the sample selection problem. When we regress, for example, waiting time in public health clinics or satisfaction with public schools on a set of explanatory variables, the sample space is limited with households that choose public service providers over the private ones. When such a selection process exists, linear regression estimates have to be adjusted for the fact that the dependent variable is the outcome of a nonrandom selection process. To tackle the issue of sample selection bias in regression results, we use
Heckman's selection method (Heckman (1979)). The basic idea of a sample selection model is that the outcome variable, y, is only observed if some criterion, defined with respect to a variable z, is met. The original Heckman's method involves a two-stage approach: In the first stage, a dichotomous variable z determines whether or not y is observed; in the second state, the outcome variable y is estimated conditional on its being observed. The two error terms corresponding to selection equation and outcome equation are assumed to be correlated and having a joint bivariate normal distribution. We estimate the parameters by fully maximizing the joint likelihood function, which takes into account the heteroscedasticity of the error terms 16 . These estimates are consistent and asymptotically efficient under the assumption of normality 17 . The similarity in results, in particular for the coefficient of corruption variable, reinforces our conclusion that the negative and significant effect of corruption on health and education outcomes does not arise from a selection process.
VI.2 Causality
Another concern in econometric studies is about whether the partial correlation reflects a genuine causal relationship. For example, poor service delivery may be a cause of corruption in the public sector, as well as being a consequence. It is also possible that some common source of respondent bias, like pessimism about the performance public sector, has led to worse perceptions of corruption. To tackle these problems, we use four approaches:
First, to correct potential "cynicism" of respondents towards government and the corruption level, we used a survey question that is supposed to be answered similarly (in the absence of individual bias) by all respondents: "the extent of corruption in central government".
We assumed that the average score represents the true corruption level in central government and thus, the difference between a person's responds and the average score reflects the "pessimism"
or "optimism" of that person. Using that difference as a discount factor, we updated the corruption index . We found that perceptions on national corruption is highly correlated with perceptions on local corruption (r = 0.3010, significant at 1%).
Second, we applied the standard statistical approach to resolve the reverse causality problem by using instrumental variables. Following Mauro (1997) and Friedman et al. (2000), we used the ethnic fragmentation at each municipality as an instrument for corruption at that municipality. The ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable was computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group shares, and reflected the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different groups 18 . The data for both variables were obtained from the 2000 Census of Population. As an additional instrument we also used a survey question that measures the extent to which ethnicity affects voting in local elections. 18 The exact formula is Simple correlations between these two variables and the corruption index are 0.41 and 0.47, respectively. The R square at the first stage was 0.37. We corroborated the validity of the instruments with an OIR-Hausman test 19 .
In our third approach, we transformed the dependent variables into zero to one interval, which enabled logit specification. Then, instead of trying to find an instrument that is conceptually linked to corruption, we used the polynomials of exogenous variables as instruments thanks to non-linear estimation required by logit specification 20 . The R square at the first stage was 0.65. We verified the validity of overidentifying restrictions using Hausman test 21 .
The results are summarized and compared with the results from the base models in Table   18 . In general, when a dependent variable is based on objective sources (such as test scores)
rather than subjective sources (such as satisfaction with public schools) the results are quite similar in magnitude and significance level. For example, according to our base results a 10 percent increase in corruption reduces immunization rates (as reported by the Ministry of Health)
3.6-3.8 percent. When IV approach is used, that figure is in the range of 2.2-3.0 percent. When a dependent variable reflects the observations of households, the results that are based on "cleaned" corruption perceptions somewhat differ from the base results: the magnitudes of the coefficients are lower and their statistical significance is a little weaker. Overall 9 out of 13 coefficients remain significant at 5% if the "cleaned" corruption variable is used. IV results, on 19 The test is based on regressing the residuals from the main structural equation on the entire set of exogenous variables. Under the null hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions, the test statistic, NR 2 (N is the sample size and R 2 is the uncentered the goodness of fit from the regression of residuals on all the instruments) has a χ 2 distribution with K-T degrees of freedom, where K is the number of exogenous variables and T is the number of endogenous variables. If the instruments are excluded from the structural equation correctly, the set of instruments should have no explaining power over the residuals and consequently R 2 should be low. The p-value of the test statistic is 0.76 for ethnic fragmentation and 0.52 for the ethnic voting. Hence, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that the overidenfying restrictions are valid. 20 Some dependent variables (such as test scores or immunization rates) can easily be transformed to 0-1 interval by dividing by 100. For some other variables (such as ranking in NEAT), we divided the observations by their maximum. the other hand, are still closer to the base results, suggesting that reverse causality is not serious problem.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we used data from 80 municipalities in the Philippines to assess the impact of corruption in local governments on health and education outcomes.
Our results showed clearly that corruption undermines the delivery of health services in the Philippines. We used seven different measures for the quality of health services: six of them from Household Survey (immunization of children, delay in vaccination of children, waiting time of patients, accessibility of health clinics for treatment, choosing public health clinics for immunization, and satisfaction with public health clinics) and one from the Ministry of Health (municipal average of immunization rate of children). In each case regression results indicated a significant and negative effect of corruption on the quality of health services. We also found that corruption affects health outcomes in rural areas in a different way than the urban areas. Demand for public health care is more "corruption-elastic" in the urban areas, whereas rural areas with rampant corruption suffer with more waiting at public health clinics, late immunization of infants, and less satisfaction with public health services.
There are also important poverty relevant effects. Regardless of the prosperity of a municipality, corruption hurts satisfaction with public clinics, immunization rate of children, and leads to delays in vaccinations (the magnitude of this effect is more significant in poor municipalities). However, unlike rich municipalities, poor and middle-income municipalities also report more waiting at public clinics and a higher frequency of being denied of vaccines when 21 The p-value of the test statistic was between 0.59 and 0.91 depending on the instrument tested. 25 corruption is widespread. Corruption in public clinics is also more likely to deter households living in poor municipalities and forces them to opt for self-medication.
Our results on education were similar. We used seven measures for the quality of education: various measures of test scores and household assessments of the quality of education.
Corruption hurts all education outcomes. However, its negative effect is more prevalent in rural areas than the urban. We observed, on the other hand, minor differences between rich and poor municipalities in terms of the effects of corruption. The coefficients of corruption variables are significant in both cases and similar in magnitude Taken together our results do suggest that corruption undermines the delivery of health and education. This complements cross-country findings on the subject, and adds to the expanding list of ways corruption undermines welfare. .00 (ratio of variance of random effect component to total variance). Random effects tobit gives the same as random-effects (MLE) . 3 Number of observations with weight less than 0.75: 3 4 Observations are independent across groups (regions) but not necessarily independent within groups. Dependent variable is divided into 5 categories.. 5 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. 2 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. Dependent variable is the log of time (in months) between birth of a child and his/her immunization, average of eight required immunizations (BCG, Polio 1-2-3, DPT 1-2-3, and Measles) . The sample is restricted to households with children of age 1-12. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; † significant at 15% 4 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. 2 Grouped by provinces. Likelihood ratio test of random effects (Ho: rho=0): p=1.00 with rho=0.00, where rho is the ratio of variance of random effect component to total variance. Results obtained from random effect probit are not stable and not reported 3 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. Table 9 : Log of Waiting Time in Public Health Clinics (HC), Household Survey *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; † significant at 15%; 4 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. 2 Grouped by provinces. Likelihood ratio test of random effects (Ho: rho=0): p=0.00 with rho=0.46, where rho is the ratio of variance of random effect component to total variance. When corruption variable is disaggregated based on the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor), the results become unstable and are not reported. 4 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. 4 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. 4 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. 1 Number of observations with weight less than 0.75: 9 in the 1 st column, 6 in the 2 nd column. 2 Grouped by regions. Observations are independent across groups (regions) but not necessarily independent within groups. Dependent variable is divided into 8 categories. 3 Grouped by regions. F test that all fixed effects are zero: p=0.03. Hausman test on orthogonality condition: p=0.00. Since orthogonality condition is not satisfied, random effects model is not used. 4 Since results obtained from random effects tobit model are stable, we use region dummies in a tobit model to account for fixed effects. 5 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. 2 Grouped by regions. Observations are independent across groups (regions) but not necessarily independent within groups. Dependent variable is divided into 5 categories. 3 Grouped by regions. F test that all fixed effects are zero: p=0.00. Hausman test on orthogonality condition: p=0.00. Since orthogonality condition is not satisfied, random effects model is not used. 4 Grouped by regions. Wald test on existence of random effects (Ho: σu=0): p=1.00 with rho=0.00, where rho is the ratio of variance of random effect component to total variance. 5 Corruption variable in the original model is divided based on, first, the location (urban vs. rural) and then the prosperity of municipalities (rich, middle income, and poor). To determine the prosperity of a municipality we use the official guidelines provided by the Government of Philippines that divides municipalities into six categories based on average income in the last three years. Coefficients of other variables are not reported. 
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